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We do not wear upon our sleeve
That damaging star of shame
But need we symbols to believe
We’re Jews in all but name?
raymond pillai, “labourer’s lament”
Conventional wisdom has it that contemporary international move-
ments of labor are quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from those of
the past, and that the “scale and diversity of today’s migrations are beyond
any previous experience” (unpf 1993, 6). A “new age of migration” has
arisen, in which the international movement of workers has never been as
pervasive, or as socioeconomically significant, as it is today (Castles and
Miller 1993, 260). In this “new age of migration,” the Asia-Pacific is the
“newest international migration system” (oecd 1992), accounting for
perhaps 35–40 percent of the four to five million workers who cross
national borders each year (Hernandez and Tigno 1995, 547).
Certainly the origins and destinations of international migration change
over time, and in this paper we use the useful heuristics of “ages” and
“systems” to define historical periods and dominant patterns in interna-
tional labor flows. There are broadly three historical periods in the Asia-
Pacific region—the age of indenture, the period of guest workers, and the
era of contract labor. In the contemporary era an “Asia-Pacific migration
system” is emerging (Massey and others 1998, 160), where a system is
defined as groups of countries that exchange labor and have “feedback
mechanisms, reciprocity and linkages between migration and other flows
—not only of people . . . , but also of capital, goods, ideas and informa-
tion” (Hugo 1996, 107). This system is composed of three subsystems:
Asia–Middle East (the movement of contract workers from South and
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Southeast Asia to the oil-producing countries); Southeast Asia–East Asia
(the movement of contract and illegal workers from developing countries
of Southeast Asia and East Asia to the newly industrializing economies of
those regions; and the Pacific system (the movement of Pacific Islanders
to countries of permanent settlement).
Focusing on temporal discontinuities and spatially specific flows, how-
ever, distracts attention from persistent structural processes that underlie
the production and reproduction of a global labor reserve. In some cases,
for example, contemporary contract labor migration is remarkably simi-
lar to historical forms of indenture, and patterns of movement can only
be explained as the effect of political-economic relationships and cultural
compatibility, themselves often a legacy of migrations in the past. In the
excited rush to proclaim “the new,” there is a danger of ignoring signifi-
cant continuities in the formation of the global labor reserve. Given pop-
ulation growth over the last few decades, the proportion of the world’s
population on the move in the second half of the twentieth century has
remained more or less constant (Martin 1997, 3), and contemporary
migration is dwarfed absolutely by the historic trans-Atlantic and trans-
Pacific flows of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Potts
1990, 71). With two-thirds of the world’s working population living in
Asia and the Pacific, and extreme intraregional inequalities in socioeco-
nomic opportunity, it is remarkable that these two regions do not account
for more movement (Martin 1997).
The dynamics of international labor migration have been recently
described in terms of a “migration transition” whereby industrialization
and shifts in domestic labor demand affect the balance of immigration and
emigration of labor (Martin 1994). Evoking the now discredited stage
models of economic development, this concept is based on the generaliza-
tion of observed “turning points” in the recent migration experience of
European countries—Italy, for example, was an important source of labor
for western European economies until the mid-1970s, but has subse-
quently become a destination for international migrants from developing
countries, including sixty thousand Filipinos (Abella 1995b). According
to this model, “labor migration is a normal part of economic develop-
ment” (Abella 1995a) as workers are displaced from traditional agricul-
ture and “emigration pressure” builds up to spill over borders if there is
a pattern of established transnational relationships (Martin 1994). Subse-
quent economic growth and fertility decline gradually produce tight labor
markets in some sectors, such that, in an intermediate stage, developing
countries export some types of labor but import others—as do Malaysia,
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Korea, and Thailand at present. Once they have reached advanced stages
of development, and are over the “migration hump,” they become labor-
importing countries like Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Palau at first sight appears to fit into the transition stage—it now hosts
perhaps six thousand overseas contract workers (75 percent Filipino),
while about five thousand Palauans (30 percent of the national popula-
tion) live overseas (Sudo 1997, 2). However, this small island society and
dependent economy is surely not industrializing, and it seems unlikely the
emigration of Palauans will reverse despite the demand for labor. Most
Asia-Pacific countries are both source and destination of different types of
labor, as labor markets are not only differentiated into sectors, but also by
ethnicity, class, gender, and nationality. Also, what this economistic model
recognizes as a contingency—“if there is a pattern of established relation-
ships”—has everything to do with conditions creating relative demand
and supply, which are largely structured by differential rates of capital
penetration and the processes of uneven development that have taken
place over centuries, not decades (Potts 1990, 6). Descriptive and deter-
minist models cannot explain how, within the generalized production of a
global labor reserve, regional and bilateral systems develop and remain
distinctive, that is, how labor market differentials are translated into self-
sustaining migration networks and institutions (see R Cohen 1995, 3).
Understanding the particularism of international migration requires a
comparative historical approach, and we begin this paper with a brief
review of three stages in Asia and the Pacific, together with a description
of the three contemporary subsystems in the region. Our purpose is to
highlight some of the continuities, and particularly the role of uneven
development, segmented labor markets, social networks, and migrant
institutions. An explanation of international labor migration focusing on
dual labor markets and networks follows. We argue that concepts of cit-
izenship and native entitlement, together with discriminatory practices
that depend on the operation of national borders, effectively put the lie
to Marx’s famous predictions of the progressive elimination of unfree
labor, for it remains an intrinsic part of capitalist development (R Cohen
1995, 2). Nevertheless, even if migrants originally envisage movement as
a temporary sojourn, as they organize in resistance to the conditions of
unfree labor and to improve living conditions in the host country, and as
transnational community develops, they may develop commitment to per-
manent residence and abandon goals of returning to the source country.
As one observer commented ironically, “there is nothing more permanent
than temporary workers” (Martin 1994, 4).
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A Brief History of International Labor Migration in
the Asia-Pacific Region
The international movement of labor has been “a fundamental compo-
nent of capital accumulation since the beginning” (Sharma 1997, 13), and
merchants scouring Asia and the Pacific recruited, pressed, or enslaved
workers to gather products, extract natural resources, and operate their
vessels, often exploiting precapitalist social relationships in the process.
However, the institutional organization of labor migration did not begin
until the mid-nineteenth century, when the commodity boom generated a
demand for labor to meet absolute shortages in the plantations and mines
of colonial territories. The first phase of international labor migration, the
age of indenture, lasted roughly from 1830 to 1940. Although most inden-
tured workers eventually returned to their homelands, their legacy is sig-
nificant minorities who have formed ethnic communities in host countries
and often continue to influence patterns of immigration. The second
phase, from 1940 to 1970, is the period of government-sponsored guest
workers, when international migration rates were generally lower. Con-
tract labor and illegal migrants moved to meet relative labor shortages in
Europe and the Pacific Rim “settler societies” (the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand), primarily from colonies and postcolonial
societies within their proximate spheres of influence. There was also
some movement from Asia, primarily the consolidation of earlier flows of
indentured workers, many of whom settled and contributed to the cre-
ation of multicultural societies. The contemporary period, from 1970
onward, can be described as the era of contract labor, with large-scale
commercialized movement of labor to the Middle East and the newly
industrializing economies of Asia from developing countries in South and
Southeast Asia. Although rates of illegal migration are high, and many
migrants overstay, most migrants presently return home. During this
period, permanent movements from Asia and the Pacific for family
reunion in the settler societies have increased, in some cases producing a
political backlash against minorities in multicultural societies.
The Age of Indenture
During the age of indenture, workers were exported from labor-surplus
agrarian societies of Asia and the Pacific to plantations and mines in
labor-deficit territories, where a reliable and cheap source of labor was
the precondition for the capitalist production of primary commodities.
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Indenture took a variety of forms, typically articulating with indigenous
social relations, but generally was a contractual arrangement with penal
sanctions whereby workers agreed to passage to and employment in a for-
eign country under specified terms, usually for five to ten years. Recruit-
ing laborers from subsistence economies under expectation of their return
was a means by which surplus value could be transferred geographically,
whereby the rural societies of Asia and the Pacific subsidized the costs of
the social and physical reproduction of labor to capital in the metropoli-
tan cities.
The first indentures in the Pacific were for sugar plantations, and work-
ers were often recruited from existing sandalwood labor gangs. Between
1840 and 1915, over three hundred thousand Islanders were indentured
and some tens of thousands more or less enslaved (McCall and Connell
1993, 2–3; Munro 1990a, li). Melanesians, and some Micronesians, were
recruited to sugar plantations in Fiji, to copra plantations in Sämoa, New
Caledonia, and French Polynesia, and to nickel mines in New Caledonia.
Typically, labor flows took place between colonial territories, such that,
for example, the British brought Melanesians from the Solomons and the
New Hebrides (Vanuatu) to Fiji, while the Germans recruited from Papua
and New Guinea to Western Sämoa.
As a result of the effects of European diseases on indigenous popula-
tions, their perceived unsuitability or resistance to wage labor, and in
some cases a paternalistic desire to protect their way of life, planters in
the Pacific turned to Asia for workers during the commodity booms in
sugar in the 1880s and copra in the 1910s (Leckie 1990, xxxii). About 1.5
million Indians were indentured in total, including 61,000 to Fiji from
1879 to 1916 (Tinker 1974). Many workers were recruited through the
kangani system, where an established laborer was licensed to return home
to recruit a “crew,” typically drawing on kinship and traditional social
relations (Potts 1990, 79). In China, emigration was technically illegal
under Chinese law, but British agents in treaty ports recruited 500,000
Chinese laborers (Ong 1995,53), including 56,720 to Hawai‘i (1852–1899),
6,984 to Sämoa (1903–1934), 1,100 to Tahiti (1865–1867), and 6,000 to
German New Guinea (1885–1914). The practices of indenture in China
were notoriously brutal, and unknown numbers of coolies were “shang-
haied.” Large numbers of Chinese also emigrated independently under
the “credit-ticket” system, whereby travel was financed by advances from
kin or commercial moneylenders (Leckie 1990, xxxiii).
In Japan, the dislocation of the countryside and the growth of large
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port cities subsequent to the Meiji restoration led to government-spon-
sored emigration to relieve unemployment and poverty. Between 1868
and 1942, about 800,000 Japanese workers and their families went over-
seas to work, principally to Hawai‘i and the United States mainland
between 1890 and 1910 (231,000 and 107,000 respectively). Smaller
numbers were deployed throughout the Pacific in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, to work in New Caledonia’s nickel and Tahiti’s phosphate mines,
and as sugar workers and pearl divers. In addition, 2 million settled in the
overseas territories of East Asia—Manchuria (270,000), Korea (753,000),
and Taiwan (397,000)—and the Pacific (Okunishi 1995, 139). Labor
deployment was an important aspect of Japan’s desire to expand its influ-
ence in the “south seas,” particularly Micronesia, during the nan’yö period
(1880–1945). Beginning modestly with small trading posts, Japanese firms
ultimately established successful plantations and factories dependent on a
well-coordinated flow of Japanese immigrants, primarily families, living in
large-scale settlements. By 1942 the Japanese population in Micronesia
(96,000) exceeded the number of Micronesians. In Palau, Japanese gov-
ernment investment in agricultural settlements and the fishing industry
brought a flood of immigrants and triggered a building boom in the har-
bor town of Koror, transforming the small settlement into a thriving port
and colonial capital (Peattie 1988, 174). In 1938, the Japanese population
in Palau reached 15,000—more than double the indigenous population.
Defeat in World War II ended the nan’yö period, with most of the Japan-
ese settlers evacuated during the war, and those remaining repatriated
immediately afterward. 
Japanese labor was recruited by small-scale independent agents, the
imin-kaisha, but regulated under legislation passed in 1894, and the gov-
ernment subsidized recruitment from 1921 (Shimpo 1995, 49). At the same
time, an 1899 imperial decree forbade all foreigners from working in most
economic sectors (Potts 1990, 151); nevertheless large numbers migrated
from China and Korea. Japan provides an early, but long-lived example
of the apparently contradictory and supposedly temporary situation of
simultaneous labor export and import. 
Recruitment patterns varied over time as government policies shifted, as
workers organized on the basis of ethnic identity, and as hostility mounted
between migrants and indigenous populations. The changing patterns of
recruitment in Hawai‘i, for example, were due to the planters’ strategy of
countering labor organization within the existing ethnic workforce
(Beechert 1993); similar colonial “race-making” occurred in the Pacific
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Islands: for example, Javanese became the preferred indentured labor in
New Caledonia after 1861 because they were found to assimilate relatively
easily and, unlike Chinese and Japanese, did not compete with French busi-
ness interests after their contracts expired (Willson, Moore, and Munro
1990, 87).
Ironically, the very characteristics that made them ideal coolies—their
values of hard work, individual sacrifice, and collective endeavor—became
a distinct disadvantage to colonial authorities when indentured workers
settled permanently and moved into trade (Ong 1995, 52). Restrictions
were placed on Chinese trading activities, for example, in Kiribati, Tahiti,
and Papua New Guinea, and on the Japanese in New Caledonia, Hawai‘i,
and Sämoa. Many Indian migrants to Fiji were motivated by prospects of
claiming land so that only 40 percent of the so-called girmitiyas took up
the free passage home; their successful participation in the economy has
produced a long-standing cultural resentment that informed the coup d’é-
tat in 1987.
Indentured laborers had diverse individual circumstances and motiva-
tions for migration, but common to all of the migration flows was the
development of recruitment systems that incorporated existing social net-
works into new institutions, often promoted and regulated by govern-
ments. These institutions were also adapted by migrants in order to estab-
lish and maintain a presence in the host country. Large numbers recruited
family members and spouses, and exploited opportunities to settle, engage
in trade, and purchase property, ultimately establishing attachment to
place and rights to residence in the new land. 
The Period of the Guest Worker 
Indenture was progressively eliminated, beginning with Malaysia in 1878
and finally dying with the Dutch administration of the East Indies in 1941,
as a combination of several circumstances, including opposition to its
abuses by labor organizations and liberal metropolitan governments,
restrictions imposed by nationalist governments in the labor-surplus coun-
tries, decreasing commodity prices due to war and depression, and tech-
nological innovations that progressively made the labor-intensive planta-
tion form of production obsolete. The mass movement overseas of
millions of marginalized peasants in Asia slowed dramatically. 
Meanwhile, relative shortages of labor in the settler societies and
Europe led to the import of unskilled workers from selected sources. The
bracero program was introduced in the United States in 1942 to meet
392 the contemporary pacific • fall 2000
shortages in agriculture, which had been slow to improve productivity
and so paid low wages. The European guest-worker programs beginning
in the 1960s attracted hundreds of thousands of unskilled agricultural, ser-
vice, and industrial workers from neighboring southern European coun-
tries and former colonies. The scale in the Pacific settler societies was alto-
gether smaller, but New Zealand, for example, began importing unskilled
contract labor from Western Sämoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau,
supplemented in the 1960s with agricultural workers from Fiji and Tonga
(Sudo 1997, 3; Crocombe 1974). Here, as in the case of Mexican migrants
in the United States and gastarbeiter in Germany, even after contract labor
migration has stopped, migrant networks continue to supply illegal work-
ers, asylum seekers, and family members petitioning for reunion. Designed
to provide a short-term solution to sectoral labor shortages, guest-worker
programs develop into self-sustaining flows that prove politically and eco-
nomically costly to control. The introduction of “family reunion” prefer-
ences, for example, has generally backfired: though originally conceived
as a means to meet labor needs and continue the process of nation-build-
ing by increasing European stock, instead Asian and Pacific Islanders
have taken advantage of the program (Macura 1994, 2; Reimers 1983).
As Sassen has pointed out, patterns in international migration are all too
often the unintended consequence of ill-conceived policy (1996).
While selectively promoting migration of unskilled workers, and autho-
rizing family reunion, developed countries also encouraged migration of
“ptk” workers (professional, technical, and kindred), who were expected
to assimilate into the native middle class. Postwar prosperity in oecd
countries led to an increased demand for personal services and a shortage
of professionals, particularly in health care. Racially specific immigration
policies were replaced with occupational quotas allowing recruitment of
professionals, such as doctors and nurses, raising the serious issue of the
“brain drain,” that is, the loss of highly qualified and productive work-
ers embodying significant investments of human capital: in other words,
the geographical transfer of value in human form. This problem exem-
plifies the potential contradiction between individual and collective inter-
ests, where migration is rational for the individual, but may not benefit
society as a whole. In developing countries, educational programs osten-
sibly to their benefit introduce “western, primarily US, material and tech-
nology into their economic and educational systems,” ultimately produc-
ing a surfeit of professionals and technical labor (Liu 1995, 256). 
The complex combination of race and class in migration policy is well
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illustrated by the case of New Zealand, which long recruited unskilled
Pacific Islanders, but which has relatively low levels of family reunion
(Rod and Williams 1996, 35). New Zealand liberalized immigration pol-
icy in 1986, but was faced with so many Pacific Islanders taking advan-
tage of free entry that the program was abandoned the same year and a
new points system made migration for unskilled Islanders almost impos-
sible. Skilled workers from Asia, on the other hand, are warmly welcomed
as part of New Zealand’s Asia 2000 policy, and the government promotes
entrepreneurial and professional immigration from Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and Korea. Controversy has erupted since some of these migrants have
established households in the settler society, and thereby gained rights to
education for their children, but have returned to their original employ-
ment or business (Skeldon 1994). Although there are only small numbers
of these “astronauts,” media attention reinforces the negative stereotypes
of economic migrants as opportunists exploiting the generosity of the host
society. Ironically, if the segmentation of colonial labor markets led to the
development of ethnically marked “entrepreneurial minorities,” such as
the Chinese, in the Pacific-Asia region, this pattern is being repeated as
ethnic enclaves are created in settler societies, where the Chinese again,
for example, are confined to a narrow range of professional occupations
and business activities (Massey and others 1998, 182). 
The Era of Contract Labor Migration
Rates of international migration were relatively low in the immediate post-
war years, but increased rapidly with the development of commercial con-
tract migration to the Middle East in the 1970s, and to Asia’s newly indus-
trializing economies in the 1980s (see Athukorala 1993, 30).
The migration of workers to the Gulf is the largest of the contemporary
international labor migrations, with an average of over one million work-
ers deployed annually from the mid-1970s to the present. The oil-rich
states exhibit extreme labor shortages in highly segmented labor markets
as a result of the very low national labor force participation, and access of
nationals to government employment and nonlabor income (see Alegado
and Finin, this issue). Asian workers are reliable and cheap and, unlike
other Arab nationals who might invoke ethnicity to support demands for
better treatment and are more likely to migrate with families, they are
clearly temporary aliens unlikely to challenge the authority and monopoly
of wealth enjoyed by the ruling elites of the Gulf states (Gardezi 1995).
Recruitment originally followed long-established social networks, the
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kangani again operating in South Asia, so that almost half of India’s over-
seas contract workers originate from the state of Kerala, and the major-
ity of Bangladeshis come from four eastern regions (Lim 1994, 131). How-
ever, sources were rapidly diversified, in part the result of government
policies to avoid dependence on particular sources, motivated again for
reasons of political control, and in part as a consequence of the commer-
cialization of recruitment (Alburo 1994, 56). Elasticity of supply of Asian
labor was ensured by the khafeel system, whereby a government-fran-
chised labor recruiter is issued bloc visas, typically on the basis of politi-
cal patronage, and workers are effectively bonded for the length of their
contract (Abella 1994, 169). Remarkably reminiscent of indenture, the
movement of labor is again motivated primarily by agents rather than
individuals, and the laborer has become an international commodity (Sas-
sen 1988, 50).
Migration within East and Southeast Asia has increased dramatically in
the past decade or so as the newly industrializing economies have sought
cheap overseas labor to meet sectoral labor shortages created by rapid
economic growth and exacerbated by declining fertility and slowed expan-
sion of domestic labor forces. At the same time, rapidly developing export
industrializing economies of Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and particularly the Philippines, began to officially promote the
export of labor overseas. While economic integration has facilitated the
flow of goods and capital throughout the region, the newly industrializing
economies have pursued increasing automation, relocation of labor-inten-
sive manufacturing overseas, and repatriation of targeted ethnic groups
overseas in order to reduce the flows of unskilled labor. Since the early
1980s, however, serious labor shortages have occurred in “nonexporta-
ble” sectors—those industries where capital is not footloose due to “some
necessary or preferred geographical fixedness” (Gibson and Graham 1986,
134), most obviously agricultural production, construction, retail, per-
sonal services, and entertainment—and the Asian newly industrializing
economies began to head “down a guest worker path” (Martin 1997, 9). 
Newly industrializing Asian economies still exhibit low levels of foreign
labor absorption compared with western capitalist economies at similar
levels of development (Martin 1997, 2),1 principally for political reasons.
In countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia—committed to
nationalist development goals and with political systems very different
from settler societies—national identity is constructed through powerful
ideologies of indigenousness, whereas Singapore, for example, is con-
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cerned to preserve a delicately balanced multicultural society (see Macura
1994, 171).2 Although structurally dependent on foreign labor in low-
wage sectors of the economy, in these countries migration is effectively
disguised in the form of training and education (Skeldon 1998, 39), or
denied in the form of illegal migrants who are implicitly encouraged by
poor policing and inadequate detection, at least while their services are
needed (Hugo 1995, 397). Singapore has probably the most restrictive
labor market in the world, and since 1979 it has systematically sought
to discourage labor migration through its corrective high wage policy,
improved labor productivity, relocation of manufacturing overseas, numer-
ical restrictions, and taxes designed to eliminate marginal savings on
employment of foreigners. It has attempted to expand the national labor
force by offering citizenship to professionals, favoring those of Chinese
ancestry. Foreign workers constituted 18 percent of the workforce in
1994, but they are denied accompaniment of family members and face no
prospect of legal permanent settlement, even through marriage to Singa-
poreans (cited in Freeman and Mo 1996, 164). Similarly restrictive, Japan
encourages repatriation of overseas Japanese rather than immigration, but
an estimated 300,000 illegal workers are in the country, including female
workers in entertainment and the sex industry and unskilled male labor in
shipyards and industrial production, as well as 63,000 “students” and
17,000 “trainees,” most of whom work (Okunishi 1995, 139; Quibria
1996, 91). In these cases nationalism and ethnocentrism sustain a vital
supply of cheap and flexible labor, as governments effectively condone the
operation of exploitative and sometimes criminal recruiting systems,
thereby displacing the costs of labor migration and the long-term costs of
the reproduction of labor power onto migrants and their source countries.
Two countries ostensibly illustrative of the migration transition are
South Korea and Malaysia, in the sense that they are simultaneously
importers and exporters of labor. The Korean government has promoted
overseas labor migration under bilateral agreements since the late 1960s,
and construction companies established a unique pattern of project-tied
migration under turnkey contracts in Vietnam during the war there and
subsequently in the Middle East. Despite resistance from unions, in 1991
Korea began legally admitting foreign workers under government-spon-
sored technical training programs (Newman 1995). The 30,000 or so train-
ees, however, remain a small proportion of the estimated 100,000 foreign
workers, and the difference is made up by illegal migrants. In contrast,
Malaysia is a country of largely spontaneous labor emigration, supplying
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approximately 250,000 overseas workers, the vast majority to Singapore,
but also large numbers of construction workers to East Asia and a small
number of professionals to the settler countries (Rod and Williams 1996,
26). Simultaneously, there are 563,000 legal foreign workers in Malaysia,
the majority (70 percent) from Indonesia, but a significant minority (20
percent) from the Philippines, most of whom are in Sabah, with the bal-
ance from Thailand (5 percent), Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Athukorala
1993, 40). These workers are hired to meet labor shortages in plantations
(31 percent), construction (29 percent), and domestic service (18 percent),
but they also use these “revolving doors” to establish informal enterprise
or obtain more lucrative employment. In all, perhaps as many as a mil-
lion illegal migrants have come from Indonesia, following paths from Flo-
res to Sulawesi to Sabah, and from North Sumatra or Java to peninsular
Malaysia (see Hugo 1995). Indonesian Muslims have easily obtained res-
idency and citizenship, enjoying rights denied to 850,000 ethnic Chinese
and Indians who have lived most of their lives in the country (Lim 1994,
139). However, recent protests and government concern that the new
Indonesian minority emerging in enclaves of Malaysian cities presents a
national security threat led to the launch of Operation Go Away in 1998
(M Cohen 1998, 16). 
One of the first countries to officially promote and regulate overseas
contract migration was the Philippines. The Corporate Export Strategy
introduced in 1979 gave tax breaks and other incentives to Philippines
construction companies recruiting labor for work on contracts overseas,
and the government formally took up trade in human services in 1980,
entering into a series of bilateral agreements with various labor importers.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, founded in 1982,
promotes and regulates labor export and attempts to protect and repre-
sent migrant workers, a contradictory role made increasingly impossible
by the scale of the phenomenon and the expansion of informal and ille-
gal recruitment. By 1993 an estimated 6 million Filipinos were working
overseas in 130 different countries, of whom 41 percent were legal con-
tract workers, 30 percent undocumented workers, and 29 percent settlers
(Gonzalez and Holmes 1996, 301).
Initially, most overseas workers were seamen or construction workers,
but there has been a dramatic increase in service workers, now the largest
category (35 percent), which is 90 percent female (Torres 1996, 39). Half
(49 percent) of the Philippines overseas workers are women, and Filipinas
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outnumber Filipinos 12 to 1 in Asian destinations (Fernandez 1994, 82).
Similar striking increases in female participation occur in Indonesia, where
the ratio of female to male migrants went from 1:1.4 in 1983 to 3.4:1 in
1988 (Lim and Abella 1994, 228).3 Although not a new feature of inter-
national migration—for example, as many as two hundred thousand
women were recruited as karayuki-san prostitutes to work in Japan’s over-
seas territories (Douglass and Roberts 2000; cf Warren 1993)—female
contract labor raises special concerns. Most women migrants are entering
the labor force for the first time (Asis 1995, 221), and their inexperience,
coupled with the fact that many engage in “hidden” work as domestic
helpers or “entertainers,” makes them particularly vulnerable to abuse.
The movement of Filipino workers to the Pacific has been described as
“the last wave of labor migration from Asia” (Connell 1990b, 128),
although it is probably only the latest, given the expanding potential labor
reserve in China and Indochina.4 Beginning in the 1950s, Filipinos were
contracted on military bases in Guam, which was often perceived as a
stepping-stone for migration to the United States, and they now account
for more than 25 percent of the total population of about 145,000. Smaller
numbers, but higher proportions, of Filipinos are found in the Northern
Marianas, perhaps 16,000 Filipinos out of a workforce of 37,000. Fili-
pinos have also migrated to Papua New Guinea since 1974, when they
were recruited to meet shortages in the government sector (mostly teach-
ers and nurses), and more recently they have moved into mining and log-
ging. Filipino workers in Palau number more than 3,500 of a population
of 18,000 and provide construction labor as well as service workers in the
tourist industry and domestic helpers (Alegado and Finin, this issue).
Theories of international migration rarely consider the case of the
Pacific Islands despite persistent and extensive circulation and small-island
depopulation that characterize the so-called South Pacific system (Hayes
1991; Hau‘ofa 1987). Regional specialists tend to divide the Pacific expe-
rience into three empirical categories, determined by cultural-geographi-
cal features, such that Polynesia is characterized by international migra-
tion to metropolitan countries of the Pacific rim, Melanesia by internal
migration, and Micronesia by both patterns, together with increasing
receipt of international labor migrants (Connell 1990a, 1).5 Polynesians
are said to be “highly migration oriented” (Hayes 1991, 2) and in small-
island societies migration “dominates and defines the social structure, it
is a matter of central pre-occupation for individuals and it constitutes a
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dominant theme in the cultural and symbolic structures of the societies”
(Patterson 1987, 125). In general, migration in the Pacific is explained as
“an ancient islander characteristic” (McCall and Connell 1993, 4).
The notion of timeless movement obscures the political-economic
dynamic that produces historically specific dislocations in life chances that
motivate international migration, and it accounts for neither increased
mobility over the last three decades or so, nor the specificity of flows
within and between Pacific Island territories and the Pacific rim settler
societies. World systems theory has been systematically applied to the
Pacific, however, most notably by John Connell, who argued that “migra-
tion is primarily a response to real and perceived inequalities in socio-eco-
nomic opportunities that are themselves a result of dependent and/or
uneven sectoral and regional development, a function of the penetration
of capitalism into this global periphery” (1990a, 3). The role of the state
in perpetuating dependency and international migration is acknowledged
in the concept of mirab societies, where migration generates remittances,
and aid finances local bureaucracy to provide most sources of income and
employment (Bertram and Watters 1985). Other accounts note that neo-
colonial institutions prepare Islanders, in terms of both abilities and
expectations, for occupations not available in their homelands (see Ward
1997, 182).
Still, the prime focus is on the social relations of migration, such that
movement is considered a peculiar adaptation of the kinship mode of
production to global capitalism. The individual emigrant is conceived as
part of a single organic community characterized by bilocality of its mem-
bers distributed over home territories, other Pacific states that act as
“staging camps” for further migration, and metropolitan countries (Cro-
combe 1974, 8). Over 400,000 Pacific Islanders live overseas—170,000
in New Zealand, 150,000 in the United States; 85,000 in Australia; 17,000
in Canada; 22,000 in France—distributed in what Gerard Ward has called
pan-Pacific “anastomosing patterns,” that is, in spatially extensive cor-
porate networks that channel flows of capital, labor, goods, and infor-
mation (1997, 186). They operate what Bertram and Watters called “a
transnational corporation of kin,” with members differentially adapted
to life in metropolitan and traditional societies (1985, 499).
It is estimated that more than a third of the Palauan population resides
overseas and maintains extensive networks with the homeland as well as
other overseas Palauans. Asang, for example, questions the likely effec-
tiveness of Palau government efforts to lure its overseas residents home
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with promises of satisfying employment because Palauan migration is
deeply embedded in social and cultural norms. Despite their migration to
different geographic locations, “Palauanness” is preserved through “the
social tapestry that both encourages and regulates migration” (Asang, this
isssue).
The three components of the putative Pacific-Asia “international migra-
tion system” are said to be structured in rather different fashions: Asia
and the Middle-East by the dynamics of labor supply and demand and
the changing fortunes of economic development; the Pacific by cultural
predispositions and the constant limitations of geographical scale. Hope-
fully, comparative research will progressively undermine the essentialism
as well as the economic and cultural determinism that sustains such con-
ceptions.
Explanations of Labor Migration
Explanations of the contemporary patterns of international labor migra-
tion are diverse and contradictory, the literature characterized by “a vari-
ety of competing theoretical viewpoints fragmented across disciplines,
regions and ideologies” (Massey, Arango, and Taylor 1994, 700). Never-
theless, lurking in dominant accounts of the cumulative increase in post-
war migration are two general and related factors: increased individual
mobility as a result of technological advances in transportation, and pro-
gressive integration of the world economy as a result of globalization. As
a result, Castles and Miller, for example, argued that the nation-state
should no longer be the primary spatial unit for studies of migration
(1993, 275), and Hayes that Pacific migrant societies bring into “question
the applicability of the nation-state concept to socioeconomic analysis in
the context of large-scale international migration” (1991, 22–23).
Improvements in international travel can hardly be gainsaid, but many
migrants continue to make their way by foot on forest trails and by small
vessels—into Malaysia and Thailand, for example—and for most
unskilled migrants, international travel for work is often arduous, haz-
ardous, and expensive. International labor migration is hardly as simple
a matter as boarding a plane, and in the majority of cases movement is not
an individual enterprise, but involves numerous agents and institutions.
Similarly, while ongoing transnationalization and deterritorialization of
production, and integration of cultural institutions, have effected a rela-
tive decline in the political and economic capacity of the state vis-à-vis
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international capital, these forces have not necessarily led to an erosion
of the effects of sovereignty and international borders for unskilled work-
ers. The border plays a vital role in the reproduction of the international
labor reserve, as it functions to segment national labor markets and con-
trol foreign labor recruits (Douglass and Roberts 2000). In a nontrivial
sense, international labor migration can only occur across international
boundaries: legal and institutional frameworks maintain differential labor
markets, while state agencies manage labor immigration and emigration
subject to domestic politics, often lurching from promotion of migration
and even tolerance of illegal labor flows to virtual closure of borders and
hostile clampdowns (Martin, Mason, and Tsay 1995, 117).
If technological changes have increased mobility for some migrants,
they have also enhanced the capacities of most states to restrict, regulate,
and repatriate others (Gould and Findlay 1994, 278). Even as restrictions
are removed on the transnational flows of capital, information, and ser-
vices, when it comes to the international trade in labor, “we see the
national state claiming all its old splendor and asserting sovereign right
to control its borders and to grant citizenship” (Sassen 1996, 9). More so
in Asia and the Pacific, since while the rest of the world develops eco-
nomic pacts and trade agreements to pursue integrated economic devel-
opment, this region is “taking care of business” through the increasing
volume and complexity of capital and labor flows (ilo 1992, 48).
Linkages between countries resulting from movements of capital
(whether as direct foreign investment or bilateral aid), international trade,
and media are important in opening up “transnational space” for the cir-
culation of labor (Lim and Abella 1994, 209). Foreign capital investment
in particular may lead to the proletarianization of the labor force and
incorporate workers into the labor reserve (Sassen 1988). As Sharma
noted, “it appears that as capital flows into a county, labor begins to flow
out and conversely, as capital flows out . . . (im)migrant labor begins to
flow in” (1997, 31). This occurred historically with capital penetration of
the countryside under colonialism and the displacement of the millions of
peasants who became urban migrants or indentured workers, but is also
apparent in contemporary Southeast Asia where offshore investment by
East Asian capital accompanies flows of workers from Malaysia, Thai-
land, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Significantly, the recent economic
crises in the region have produced “Asia’s new jobless,” a large reserve
army moving in and out of temporary, low-wage employment unpro-
tected from unscrupulous and abusive employers, and victims of smug-
gling rings and corrupt officials (Economist, 28 Mar 1998).
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If economic dislocation provides the “push factor” for international
labor migration, the “pull factor” is income opportunity provided in the
segmented labor markets of destination countries (Piore 1986, 24).
According to the dual-labor-market theory of international migration, in
developed countries, workers in capital-intensive industries are effectively
treated as part of “capital”: invested with education and specialized train-
ing, and organized into unions that protect their collective rights, they
become a fixed factor of production too valuable to lose during periods
of low demand. Workers in the secondary sector, however, are dismissed
during economic downturns without either capital or the state having to
bear the costs of their unemployment. Many of the jobs in the secondary
sector are in “3d” industries, so-called because the work is difficult, dan-
gerous, and dirty, and wages are depressed by a “structure of expecta-
tion” based on a correlation between status and remuneration. National
workers generally shun secondary-sector employment, and labor short-
ages are met by mobilizing reserves only marginally invested in the labor
market, traditionally women and youth. Shortages have intensified, how-
ever, because of social and demographic changes in the labor market and
because services provided by low-wage workers are income elastic so
demand increases with economic development (Abella 1995a, 127). Over-
seas labor is the obvious solution because migrants derive their social sta-
tus from their roles in their home community, and “they are also
untouched by the menial, even demeaning, character of the work” (Piore
1986, 25).
From this perspective it becomes clear why a university-educated
woman from the Philippines is willing to accept a job as a domestic ser-
vant overseas: her “migration project” may entail sacrificing high social
status at home for a long-term income stream that supports her extended
family, still the point of reference for her sense of identity (see Barsotti
and Lecchini 1995). Similarly it is clear why “cheap” and “flexible” labor
is sought by employers and the national governments of, say, Singapore
or Hong Kong (Sharma 1997, 28–29). Most Asian and Pacific destination
countries adopt versions of what Freeman and Mo have called the “3s
strategy,” targeting specific sectors and skill categories of migrants, and
admitting these laborers for the short term only (Freeman and Mo 1996,
156). Migrant laborers are cheap because the full costs of the reproduc-
tion of their labor power are not borne by national capital and the state,
but are partly paid by their kinship groups, communities, regions, and
countries of origin (see Sider 1992, 232). Flexibility results from lack of
protection under labor law, lack of rights to “social wages,” and lack of
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citizenship. Evidence suggests that the flexibility to fire workers in
response to market conditions is more significant than low wages in deci-
sions to hire foreign labor (Lee and Sivananthiran 1996). Migrant labor
is effectively restricted to the secondary sector by the politico-juridical
requirements of citizenship and by regulations tantamount to reproduc-
ing unfree labor. 
Sensational media coverage highlights child and female prostitution in
East and Southeast Asia, and “indentured servitude” of laborers trans-
ported by notorious and mysterious “Asian gangs” (Lintner 1993, 26),
but few of the millions of other contemporary contract laborers are fully
informed of their rights, and most are encumbered by the baggage of eco-
nomic and social debt. Information is tightly controlled by recruiting
operations that are underregulated and sometimes exploitative. Even offi-
cially sanctioned recruits pay placement and other fees, mortgaging prop-
erty or borrowing from usurers to meet expenses, or receiving advances
from agents that will subsequently be deducted from wages (Goss and
Lindquist 1995). Even before recruitment, potential migrants must mobi-
lize resources through kinship and other social networks, and young
female workers, in particular, may be effectively bonded by filial loyalties
to particular employers, forms of employment, and incomes.
Overseas contract workers are tied by strict contracts to particular
employers; to a specific type, location, and length of employment; to the
form, amount, and currency of compensation; and often to compulsory
savings schemes. Their activities in the host country are regulated in
terms of entry, exit, and internal travel; membership of worker’s associa-
tions or unions is denied or restricted; family visits or reunions are pro-
hibited or limited; and rights to petition for legal residency are denied
(Sharma 1997, 18). The “new age of migration” is, therefore, distin-
guished by conservation of means by which state and capital preserve
cheap and flexible reserve labor.
This is only one side of the story, however, for international labor
migrants find ways to resist and subvert these practices, organizing to
improve working conditions and remuneration, and to obtain legal resi-
dential status, thereby freeing themselves from noneconomic relations of
exploitation. Part of their struggle is to reproduce the networks and insti-
tutions that link their home and host societies, vital to perpetuating
migration as a survival or accumulation strategy, and part is to transform
their secondary status in their host societies, to obtain legitimate and
long-term residency. 
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International migration, once initiated, tends to perpetuate itself in the
form of networks, that is, “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants,
former migrants, and non migrants in origin and destination areas
through ties of kinship, friendships, and shared community origin” (Mas-
sey and others 1993, 448). Networks originally develop from social rela-
tionships mobilized to further individual migration where they function to
provide information, access to gatekeepers, and funding for transporta-
tion or fees, so reducing the costs and risks of migration. Consequently,
“the size of the migratory flow between two countries is not strongly cor-
related to wage differentials or employment rates, because whatever
effects these variables have in promoting or inhibiting migration are pro-
gressively overshadowed by the falling costs and risks of movement stem-
ming from the growth of migrant networks over time” (Massey and oth-
ers 1993, 450). Networks have a life of their own, so that by the time
immigration controls are imposed it is usually too late to stop the flow
(Acevedo and Espenshade 1992). So oriented to emigration are the people
of Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and so well orga-
nized their national institutions and informal networks, that Hugo has
described them as suffering “emigration fever” (1995, 397).
Networks are not only governed by local norms of reciprocity and sus-
tained by personal contact, however, as they are rapidly penetrated by
commercial and bureaucratic relations, and they may make migration
more selective and competitive (Goss and Lindquist 1995, 330). Kearney
spoke of networks as “income-seeking organisms” (1986), and Hugo
described an “international migration industry” consisting of state
bureaucracies, recruiters, lawyers, migration agents, transport operators,
travel agents, and middle persons of various kinds (1996, 108). Overseas
migration in Southeast Asia, for example, involves kinship, patron-client
relations, and chains of informal brokers—including previous migrants,
village headmen, and construction foremen whose recruitment of their
personal workforce is remarkably reminiscent of the kangani system
(Spaan 1994; Singhanetra-Renard 1992; Lindquist 1993). 
Although international recruitment of labor is conceived by govern-
ments as a stopgap measure, and migrants themselves view overseas
employment as a temporary means to improve their life chances, migra-
tion almost inevitably leads to long-term settlement. Neoclassical eco-
nomic theories predict the progressive equalization of wage differentials
through migration, but destination countries become dependent on immi-
grants who subsidize the costs of domestic production and consumption,
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and source countries become dependent on remittances. Public and pri-
vate agencies multiply and elaborate in both countries to take a cut of the
differential in cost and returns to labor across borders. Migrants too are
obviously invested in the reproduction of networks and institutions that
facilitate movement, and these in turn may be adapted to sustain bilocal-
ity, or transnationalism, spreading the household across borders. 
Conclusion
International labor migration is an individual and institutional response to
inequalities in life chances produced by the uneven development of capi-
talism. It is mediated first and foremost by the legal regimes and labor
policies of the state, but also by elaborate networks of formal public and
commercial agencies and informal agents, and of kinship and traditional
sociocultural relationships, all of which combine to transcend geographi-
cal distance and political boundaries. Such mediating institutions also pro-
vide resources with which migrants might cope with their ambivalent sta-
tus in the destination, their “betweenness” in the ambiguous social space
that defines the intersection of secondary labor markets and nationality.
Central to an understanding of international labor migration is the use
of the sovereignty of the state and the bundle of natural rights accorded to
citizens to restrict the access of even legal immigrants to the “social” wage,
that is human services provided by the local and national state in the form
of long-term health care, housing, and education (Rodriguez 1996, 32). In
the contemporary context of relative labor shortages, the promotion and
tolerance of immigration represents a compromise between the needs of
capital and the state for cheap labor and the demands of indigenous work-
ers for the protection of native entitlements. 
In the settler societies an uneasy tension exists between ideologies of
civic pluralism, in which citizenship is defined politically, that is, by alle-
giance to the state and its symbols of constitution and flag, and nativism,
in which citizenship is defined by essential characteristics. This situation
permits the naturalization of immigrants independent of race and ethnic-
ity, albeit with some significant restrictions and subject to reversals result-
ing from resistance by domestic “distributional coalitions” (cited in oecd
1992, 63), which in turn raises the specter of a “new nativism” in the
United States, particularly in the so-called front-line states such as Cali-
fornia (Kearney 1991). In Asia and the Pacific nativism dominates, and
indigenousness is typically defined by jus sanguinis (sanguinity), such that
rights of citizenship are reserved for citizens and their direct kin. Jus solis
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(place of birth) simply does not apply to ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and
Indians in Fiji, for example. In Japan, an official prophecy on the impos-
sibility of foreigners assimilating to its dominant culture is (self-)fulfilled
by discriminatory policies that ensure that ethnic Koreans remain second-
class citizens, even after two generations. In Singapore, a potential future
problem is prevented by compulsory regular pregnancy tests for unskilled
female migrants! 
If the states of Asia exhibit a “lingering authoritarianism” that sustains
a political will capable of systematic discrimination against minorities,
the ultimate question may be one of economics, since guest-worker sys-
tems are extremely expensive to maintain—the United States, for exam-
ple, spends $3 billion on immigration control (half of what it spends on
all forms of overseas aid). There are also practical problems in enforcing
the distinction between temporary and permanent residence, and
unskilled and skilled workers, and containing immigrant workers within
particular sectors (Martin, Mason, and Tsay 1995).
Again, however, this is only one side of the story, for migrant networks
seem to have a life of their own, while immigrant associations, business
associations, civil rights lobbies, and national government and nongovern-
ment organizations engage in the “battle for the border” (Rodriguez 1996).
The battle occurs on several fronts, involving struggles for worker and
citizenship rights, and for the capacity of working-class and peasant com-
munities to spatially organize social reproduction across international
economic space. States are clearly losing the battle historically: fully one-
third of the 9 million or so legal immigrants in the United States today
were once “temporary” and illegal aliens (cited in Martin 1994, 3), and in
an amnesty in Malaysia in 1992, 450,000 Indonesians registered (Lim and
Abella 1994, 228).
Transnational communities develop from international labor migration
not as a necessary outcome, but through collective struggle against the
state and institutionalized forms of ethnocentrism and racism that repro-
duce the reserve of unfree labor. The experience of European and settler
societies suggests that the struggle potentially opens up a space for the
politics of pluralism and multiculturalism. Asia and the Pacific have very
different political ideologies and cultural values, and it may be wrong to
assume that they will follow the same path.6 Still, these countries, with
the possible exception of Singapore, lack the will and capacity to police
immigration, and systematically ignore and undermine their own official
policies in the interests of economic growth (Cornelius, Martin, and Hol-
lifield 1994, 387). Most likely they will not be able to resist the guest-
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worker path, which must surely lead to progressive naturalization and
labor freedom. Ultimately, however, this is not a matter for speculation
but for political engagement.
Notes
1 There are 3.7 million foreign workers, about 2.7 percent of the total labor
force, in seven major Asian immigration countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand), ranging from less than 1 percent in
Korea and 1.5 percent in Japan, to 16 percent in Malaysia and 21 percent in Sin-
gapore, compared with 5–10 percent in the settler societies and Europe (Martin
1997).
2 Contemporary Fiji is similar to Malaysia in this regard: in the former, full
citizenship rights belong only to Melanesians, and in the latter only to indige-
nous Malays (bumiputera).
3 Indonesian regulations encourage female migration by offering greater max-
imum fees for recruitment of women (Abella 1995b, 245).
4 As many as 0.75 million Chinese have emigrated in recent years, some
200,000 to the United States, 200,000 to Asia, 150,000 to Russia, and 100,000
to Europe (Hugo 1995, 398). A state-owned company promotes labor migration
as a solution to economic and political problems. Labor export is expected to
expand dramatically in the coming years: “The only question is, how large will
it get?” (Saywell 1997, 52).
5 Seriously depopulated small islands include Niue, Wallis and Futuna, the
Cook Islands, Pitcairn Island, and Tokelau, all of which have a majority of their
populations living overseas; high rates of Polynesian migration, particularly to
New Zealand and more recently to the United States, occur in the Sämoas and
Tonga, which have 40 percent and 30 percent of their national populations over-
seas, respectively; international migration from Melanesia is mostly from Fiji,
especially of skilled and semi-skilled ethnic Indians since the 1987 coup; Micro-
nesians migrate from Guam and the Northern Marianas to the US mainland, but
these states also receive international migrants, especially Filipinos in construc-
tion and tourist services. 
6 Martin, for example, speculated on the basis of European and North Amer-
ican experience that permanent settlement and family reunion might lead after
two or three decades to an immigrant population of 10–20 percent of the peak
migrant worker levels, even in the countries that actively rotate workers and
restrict settlement, such as Singapore and the Gulf States, and as high as 50–60
percent of peak migrant levels in countries that progressively expand worker
rights (1997, 24).
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Abstract
Conventional wisdom seems to have it that the world has entered a “new age of
migration” in which the international movement of labor is qualitatively and
quantitatively distinct from the past. The dominant paradigm links labor move-
ment to economic development, particularly for Asian migration, explaining
migration in terms of differentials in labor demand and wages, while Pacific
scholars have generally resorted to the particularities of Polynesian, Melanesian,
and Micronesian cultures and island societies. This paper rejects these assump-
tions. We first describe the history of the Asia-Pacific migration system in three
phases—the Age of Indenture, the Period of the Guest Worker, and the Era of
Contract Labor Migration—establishing the scale and duration of flows and
examining some of the mechanisms. We then review competing explanations of
international migration, arguing that a key factor that economistic and essen-
tialist explanations overlook is networks and institutions. We show how these
are both reproduced and recreated in similar forms, and that transnational com-
munities are almost inevitably the result. 
keywords: Asian migration, indenture, international labor migration, migra-
tion networks, migration systems, overseas contract workers, Pacific Islands
